



**What determines party leaders' acquaintanceship with**  
**New Public Management concepts in Flemish municipal councils?**  
*(preliminary draft- suggestions are welcome)*

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## **Introduction**

Efficiency driven managerial reforms dominate the political agenda and practice throughout Europe (Steyvers et al 2008). This contemporary logic of organizing in western local government has been referred to as New Public Management (NPM). It is seen as the wave of restructuring governmental organizations with businesslike instruments and styles during the last decades (Hood 1991, 1995, Windels 2006). NPM is regarded as a toolbox from which individual tools are taken to solve current problems. The modernization does not only affect administration, restructurings also encompass political institutions and ways of organizing politics and public decision- and policymaking (Hansen 2001). NPM not solely advocates administrative innovation, it also aims to make the responsible political leaders much more businesslike, i.e. market-, performance-, cost-, efficiency-, output- and audit-oriented (Bochel & Bochel 2010, Diefenbach 2009, Pina et al. 2009, Wolmann 2012).

As a consequence, reformers undertook various initiatives to sensitize politicians for the NPM ideas (Schedler 2003). They understood that in order to successfully put the reform ideas into practice, strong support from politicians was necessary (Lapsley & Pallot 2000, Schedler 2003, Bochel & Bochel 2010, Anessi-Pessina et al. 2008). Their support and attention for NPM concepts and tools gave “political weight” to the NPM discourse and played an important role in integrating them in decision-making (Tat Kei Ho 2005). Following the NPM doctrine this meant that politicians had to be willing to modify their behaviour and support processes of decision-making with rational, objective and focused information using private sector techniques (Windels 2006).

However, it seems that reforms did not always achieve the expected change in politicians’ behaviour (Lapsley 2000). Already in the early days of their implementation, some scholars warned for unintended developments and significant gaps between expected and actual changes (Anessi-Pessina et al. 2008). Although many governmental documents and speeches have claimed a shift towards a businesslike model and attitude, closer empirical study showed that there had actually been high continuity between the old and the new (Pollitt & Bouckaert 2000).

“The gap between rhetorics and actions is so wide to provoke scepticism or, according to taste, cynicism” (Pollitt & Bouckaert 2000).

Due to the closeness of local politicians to policymaking- and implementation and the fact that they had to be willing to implement the NPM reforms from the floor (in contrast with for example national politicians working within a framework and from a certain distance), these gaps between the intended and the actual outcomes of the reforms were particularly visible at the local level.

## **Obstacles between politicians and the NPM idea**

Firstly, some authors identify ‘the lack of understanding for political processes and decision-making’ as the most fundamental problem of the NPM ideology. The unpredictable nature of political decision-making and its sensitivity to external pressure are criticised as irrational and inefficient from this NPM

logic. However, local governments are democratic political institutions, organizing public and common services for the citizens of the municipality. Politicians are the elected representatives of the plurality of opinions and interests of the citizens. (Hansen 2001). They carefully watch the common concerns and affairs of the municipality. Their role is to comprehend a subject matter from different points of view, to consider it, to compromise conflicting interests and judge what is most reasonable and appropriate in a given situation. This genuine political and democratic dimension of the role and skills of elected councillors is not easily combined with the propagated idea of rational and efficient decision-making (Hansen 2001). NPM's concept of efficiency is grounded in economics. However, this 'economic efficiency' is clearly not easily matched with 'political efficiency'- a concept that focuses on the efforts needed to attract voters in elections (ter Bogt 2004, Yetano 2009).

Secondly, NPM advocates a clear and distinct separation between 'politics and administration'. However, historically and constitutionally such a distinction and separation of political versus administrative competence and decision making was not instituted as part of local government structure. The local council has, as an elected assembly of representatives and ombudsmen of the citizens, always been granted complete political as well as administrative competence and responsibility to handle local affairs (Steyvers et al. 2006). The study of Steyvers et al (2006) showed that more than half of the mayors (fully) disagreed with the idea that politicians should define objectives and control output but never intervene in the task fulfilment of the local administration. Support for this role distinction among Belgian mayors thus seems rather limited.

Notwithstanding these fundamental reasons for scepticism towards politicians' absorption of the NPM discourse, we still lack systematic empirical evidence. Many studies show that it is still not clear today exactly how much of the 'NPM story' has been absorbed in reality by politicians all over the world (Schedler 2003, Askim 2007). Moreover, besides the already mentioned fundamental obstacles, other, more individual factors could also affect politicians' adoption of the NPM ideas and instruments.

### **A weak spot in research**

Research has provided far less knowledge about politicians' than about managers' experiences with NPM concepts and tools. Moreover, it is not evident that findings apply to politicians as they conduct their work in very different ways (Askim 2008, Lee 2008, Liguori et al. 2009).

In general, political and social scientists show a certain restraint to study management concepts. They rather stress the individual profile of councillors, (Steyvers et al. 2006, Guérin & Kerrouche 2008, Verhelst et al. 2011). Vice versa, apart from a few notable exceptions (authors such as Askim 2007, 2008, ter Bogt, 2004) politicians are an undervalued group in economic research.

Most evidence on politicians' knowledge of NPM is rather anecdotal and stems from case studies taking a qualitative approach (Guérin & Kerrouche 2008, Verhelst et al. 2011). They have provided valuable insight and interesting hypotheses but little systematic evidence (Askim 2007, Steyvers et al. 2006, Verhelst et al. 2011). Several of these studies have addressed the more 'technical' aspects of NPM

Reforms. Subsequently, a lot of research has been conducted into promises, usefulness and potential of instruments such as the Balanced Score Card, competitive tendering, performance measurement, performance related pay, ....

Executive politicians, such as mayors, are very often the research subject. Because of their more operational and executive involvement, their adoption of NPM could be different. To our knowledge only few studies focused on councillors and they do not consider the party leaders in the council as a separate group (Askim 2007). However, party leaders are key members of the council, the so called front benchers between the councillors (Askim 2007, Bochel & Bochel 2010). Their position provides room for strong minded individuals to exploit their role if they choose so (Bochel & Bochel 2010). Because of their closeness to the NPM reforms, councillors, and especially the party leaders can be considered as key political NPM protagonists within their local government (Bochel & Bochel 2010, Brugué & Vallès 2005). Their acquaintanceship with NPM concepts may be used as a relevant indicator for the extent to which the NPM discourse is absorbed by politicians.

## **Contribution**

The contribution of this paper is threefold:

Firstly, this paper draws on different theoretical and empirical insights from accounting, political and public administration and -management literature. This combination of different dimensions, is rather innovative.

Secondly, except for some rather exploratory research attempts, it has not yet been made clear to what extent the NPM ideology has been absorbed by councillors, nor by which factors this is affected (Tat Kei Ho 2005, Schedler 2003). The article sets a state of the art of the extent to which ('how much') party leaders are acquainted with NPM tools and instruments in Flemish municipal councils. It is intended as a quantitative complement for the existing findings of qualitative research.

Thirdly, it intends to reveal whether factors such as businesslike experience, education or multiple office holding can explain party leaders' differences in degree of acquaintanceship with NPM instruments and tools.

## **Research question**

The aim of this paper is both to disclose the NPM acquaintanceship of local councillors, by focusing on party leaders in the closed environment of the local council and to identify the factors that determine their knowledge of different NPM concepts in Flemish municipalities. The analysis is certainly not intended as an evaluation of party leaders' knowledge in terms of success or failure. The first research question sets a state of the art on the extent to which party leaders in Flemish councils are acquainted with applied NPM concepts.

The second research question relates to the determining factors that may impact on party leaders' acquaintanceship with NPM.

RQ 2A -Does their acquaintanceship with NPM differ depending on council party leaders' political experience ?

RQ 2B -Does their acquaintanceship with NPM differ according to their formal political role, whether opposition or majority members?

RQ 2C -Does their acquaintanceship with NPM differ depending on their professional background ?

RQ 2D -Does their acquaintanceship with NPM differ according to their political mandate, whether combining different mandates or not?

RQ 2E -Does their acquaintanceship with NPM differ according to their education, whether economically educated or not?

## **Hypotheses**

### **1. Experience has a positive or negative effect on the acquaintanceship with NPM**

Councillors are in general increasingly highly educated and involved in local politics for a greater length of time (Guérin & Kerrouche 2008). However, research is inconclusive about the impact of politicians' experience on the adoption of NPM ideas. Some argue that highly experienced politicians have good abilities to interpret information and make use of new instruments because they are more efficient readers of documents. Due to their superior information knowledge of their polity's history they can more efficiently interpret information. In contrast, Melkers & Willoughby (2005) found that specifically performance information use decreased with experience. Inexperienced councillors were more receptive and more insecure than political veterans. De Groot et al. (2010) confirm this two rival suppositions, more experienced members tend to be more open-minded, but long-tenured members rely on routine and familiar information sources.

### **2. Formal political roles (opposition) positively influence the acquaintanceship with NPM**

We suppose that the individual party leaders decide in terms of political advantages and consensus (Liguori 2010, Johansson & Siverbo 2009 ). This means that leaders of the opposition make more use of negative information, in order to damage the majority. Askim (2008) found that backbenchers and politicians in opposition made more use of performance information than frontbenchers and politicians representing parties in power. Although his findings relate to use of a specific type of (quantitative) information, they could also point at more openness towards businesslike thinking from opposition members.

### **3. Professional use of financial information increases their acquaintanceship with NPM**

Due to the generally limited economic training of politicians, the specific professional or businesslike background of party leaders might be relevant (Brusca 1997). The use of financial information for professional reasons indicates a more businesslike attitude and a certain predisposition for control and monitoring instruments and is thus expected to exert a positive effect on the acquaintanceship with the NPM idea.

#### 4. Combination of different political mandates increases their acquaintanceship with NPM

Candidates for elections are becoming younger, but they are being mobilized more often. This means that multiple office holding occurs more frequently (Weekers et al. 2007). Politicians combining different mandates are indeed more experienced. Due to their broad network within and outside the political body, they are assumed to be better positioned to interpret unfamiliar information or work with new instruments (Askim 2008). As other governments are also subject to NPM reforms, they might have an information advantage and a superior knowledge of NPM related tools.

#### 5. Education in economy enhances their acquaintanceship with NPM

Councillors are in general increasingly highly educated (Guérin & Kerrouche 2008). However, there is disagreement in literature concerning the influence of education in general on the adoption of NPM. The explanation usually offered is that people with advanced degrees and training are skilled at handling large amounts of formal, numerical or technical information, often generated as result of NPM inspired reforms. But Askim (2008) found that in the specific case of performance information utilization was lowest among the best educated councillors because they only looked up performance information when they were unsure what to do, the best educated already possessed the knowledge needed to make decisions (Askim 2008). However, in the NPM logic, politicians should be able to respond to, interpret, comply with, or challenge financial information (Guthrie et al. 1999). As a consequence, reformers undertook many initiatives to provide local politicians the necessary quantitative and financial information for efficient decision-making (Lapsley 1999, Askim 2007, Yetano 2009, Leroy 2011). Therefore, we argue that a specific economic education enhances financial, analytical and strategic skills, very relevant for the adoption of NPM ideas.

### **Empirical setting**

Flanders counts 308 municipalities, covering between 80 and 480.000 inhabitants. They hold a threefold structure with a council, an executive and a mayor. The council is chosen through direct elections every six years. Dependent on the number of inhabitants, they count between 7 and 55 members. Most Flemish councillors have ordinary jobs and are only part-time politicians. The local councillor without an executive mandate spends on average 7.63 hours per week on his task as councillor and this for a very limited monetary compensation (Reynaert et al. 2010). 29% of the Flemish councils is chaired by a councillor, in 68 % it is still the mayor and in 4% it is an alderman. Multiple office holding is a frequent phenomenon in Belgian politics. During the 2007 Belgian federal elections, only half of the candidates were new. Of the 113 elected federal MP's in 2010, 59% held another political mandate, of which 40,7% municipal councillors. In the Flemish regional parliament this is even more manifest; of the 124

members, 107 combined a local mandate, of which 50% members of council (Weekers et al. 2007). The members of the executive (the College of Mayor and Aldermen) are elected by and among the council members, mostly as a result of a coalition agreement. About 70 % of all municipalities are coalition governments. The College consists of 2 to 10 members, they are in charge of day-to-day management and are presided by the mayor who actually is the real leader at local level (Goeminne et al. 2008, Valcke 2009). Local power (nearly) completely rests in the hands of the parties holding a majority position in the local council.

As elsewhere in Western Europe, Flemish municipalities have undergone a major change in various aspects of their organization (Windels 2006). Fitting in with the rise of NPM, the Local Government Act of 2006 (in Dutch “Gemeentedecreet”) was focused on a more businesslike and professionalized management of local government. The reform introduced new policy instruments with regard to financial management, control, audit, human resources and result oriented policy planning and evaluation. Because the Flemish Local Government Act is essentially mandatory, the context in which local council party leaders operate is largely homogeneous. Flemish municipalities share common political and institutional systems, experience the same economic shocks, employ similar budgetary processes and have identical electoral rules.

### **Data collection and research method**

Between 18/12/2011 and 05/02/2012 an online survey was conducted among party leaders in a stratified sample of 125 Flemish municipal councils. After one week a reminder was sent, bringing the response rate to a very satisfying 68% (total surveys sent out : 529, with 389 responses and after elimination of incomplete answers leading to 363 valid questionnaires). The questionnaire was pretested in a small pilot study with some field experts.

### **Methodology**

#### *The NPM acquaintanceship score*

We assume that party leaders well acquainted with NPM instruments are more convinced of the usefulness and relevance of the NPM inspired reforms (Anessi-Pessina et al. 2008). As a consequence, their NPM acquaintanceship ‘degree’ might be used as a good indicator to assess their absorption of the NPM idea.

Firstly, to assess party leaders’ NPM acquaintanceship, we measured their familiarity with a selection of five concepts (municipal management team, management control and policy cycle, internal control, autonomization and budget ownership) that represent the implementation of NPM in Flemish municipalities (Leroy 2011). Figure 1 illustrates the NPM paradigm as conceptualized by Hood (1995) and the corresponding concept from the Flemish local government act. We could call it the ‘applied part of NPM’. This construct was pretested with field experts.

Figure 1: elements of the NPM\_acquaintanceship\_score



<i>NPM Doctrine</i> (Hood 1991, 1995)	<i>5 Applied concepts in Flemish Local Government (2006)</i>
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Shift to disaggregation of units in the public sector, decentralisation	<b>1) Autonomization</b> (creation of separate quasi autonomous separate units around products or service delivery)
Visible hands-on management, delegation of budgets, more discretionary power for management and clear assignment of responsibilities	<b>2) Budget ownership</b> <b>3) Municipal management team</b>
Explicit standards and measures of performance and stress on private sector styles and management practice, private sector accounting norms, clear statements of goals, 'hard look' at objectives, stress on results rather than procedures, changing financial reporting systems, performance measurement approach, changes to internal and external public sector audits	<b>4) Internal control and audit,</b> <b>5) New management control and policy cycle ('BBC' in Dutch)</b>

Secondly, the *NPM\_acquaintanceship\_score* is used as dependent variable to perform a linear regression analysis to assess the impact of various determinants as hypothesized earlier.

### **Analyses and results (to be completed)**

#### 1. Descriptives on local party leaders

Figure 2

<b>Descriptive Statistics local party leaders N 363</b>				
		<i>Minimum</i>	<i>Maximum</i>	<i>Mean</i>
<b>AGE</b>		27	78	50,76
<b>EXPERIENCE (years in council)</b>		0,1	41	12,00
		<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>	



<b>SEX</b>	male	274	75,50%	
	female	89	24,50%	
<b>OPPOSITION/MAJORITY</b>	opposition	202	55,60%	
	majority	161	44,40%	
<b>PROFESSION</b>	occupation:none	71	19,60%	
	independent profession	76	20,90%	
	worker/labourer	13	3,60%	
	office worker/executive	108	29,80%	
	public servant/teacher	65	17,90%	
	full time politician	15	4,10%	
	party-cabinets employee	15	4,10%	
<b>EDUCATION</b>	primary education	7	1,90%	
	lower secondary education	26	7,20%	
	higher secondary education	86	23,70%	
	professional bachelor	103	28,40%	
	academic master/bachelor	133	36,60%	
	phd	8	2,20%	
<b>EDUCATION_ECONOMY</b>	NO	280	77,10%	
	YES	83	22,90%	
<b>CUMUL</b>	none	326	89,80%	
	european parlement	1	0,30%	
	federal parlement	4	1,10%	
	senate	3	0,80%	
	regional parlement	3	0,80%	
	province	11	3%	
	local executive mandate	15	4,10%	
<b>PARTY</b>	Open VLD	73	20,10%	
	CD&V (+N-VA)	88	24,20%	
	Vlaams Belang	47	12,90%	
	SPa (+Spirit)	68	18,70%	
	Groen	26	7,20%	
	N-VA	15	4,10%	
	Local party	46	12,70%	

Figure 2 shows that the average party leader in the municipal council is male, 50 years old and has been member of the council for two terms. He has in general a higher education and exercises an independent profession or works as an executive. The large majority of the party leaders are not

combining different political mandates, which suggests that mostly mayors or aldermen or other councillors combine a double mandate. All Flemish political parties are more or less proportionally represented in the sample.

## 2. Descriptives on the NPM acquaintanceship score:

To answer the first research question 'to what extent are party leaders acquainted with applied NPM concepts in Flemish municipalities, the survey asked party leaders to rate the extent to which they were familiar (acquainted with) the 5 NPM related elements. Figure 3 brings an overview.

Figure 3

Descriptives dependent variable N= 363				
		<i>Minimum</i>	<i>Maximum</i>	<i>Mean</i>
Acquaintanceship_management_team		1	5	3,28
Acquaintanceship_Internal_Control		0	5	2,69
Acquaintanceship_budgetownership		0	5	2,91
Acquaintanceship_mgt_control		0	5	2,62
Acquaintanceship_autonomization		0	5	3,17
<b>Total_SCORE_NPM_acquaintanceship</b>		<b>2</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>14,67</b>
<b>Mean_SCORE_NPM_acquaintanceship</b>		<b>0,4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>2,93</b>
Reliability Statistics	Cronbach's Alpha	0,761		

On average party leaders evaluate their NPM acquaintanceship as 'good' (value 2.92), this is not as negative or limited as could be expected from previous, mostly qualitative research. Besides, party leaders in Flemish local councils indicate to be more familiar with the municipal management team and the concepts of autonomization and budgetownership. Paired sample T tests between the means of the 5 different items show that only the difference between autonomization and management team and between internal control and management control are not statistically significant at the 5% level (see figure 7 in appendix). The value of 0,76 for Cronbach's Alpha demonstrates a good 'construct', and reveals that the five elements are together measuring the same element, NPM acquaintanceship.

### *The independent variables : Determinants of NPM score*

A linear regression analysis is performed on the dependent variable, the mean of the NPM acquaintanceship score. The model is fully illustrated in Figure 4

$\text{Model= } Y_{\text{mean\_SCORE\_NPM\_ACQUAINTANCESHIP}} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{EXP} + \beta_2 \text{EDU\_ECONOMY} + \beta_3 \text{OPP/MAJ} + \beta_4 \text{CUMUL} + \beta_5 \text{PROF.USE} + \beta_6 \text{LN\_population} + \epsilon$
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Figure 4: regression model

Hypothesis	Variable	References	Measure	Source of data	Expected sign
	<b>DEPENDENT VARIABLE</b>	Hood (1995) Leroy (2011) Anessi-Pessina, Nasi & Steccolini (2008) Askim (2007 & 2008)	NPM acquaintanceship party leaders : Mean of scores on each item (5 point likert scale)( <b>NPM</b> ): - budget controllership - municipal managementteam - autonomization - management control and policy cycle - internal control	Survey council party leaders (N= 363)	
1	<b>Experience</b>	Askim (2008) (Guérin & Kerrouche 2008) De Groot et al. (2010) Melkers & Willoughby (2005)	Years in council ( <b>EXP</b> )	Survey council party leaders (N= 363)	Cannot be signed a priori
2	<b>Economic education</b>	Bochel & Bochel (2010) Verhelst et al.(2011) Askim (2007, 2008) Guérin & Kerrouche (2008) De Groot et al. (2010) Melkers & Willoughby (2005) Weekers et al. (2007) (Brusca 1997)	Dummy for economic education (economics, applied economics, commercial school, tax, banking, marketing, commercial science, management, insurance, ...) vs not ( <b>EDU_ECONOMY</b> )	Survey council party leaders (N= 363)	Positive
3	<b>Formal position</b>		Dummy for opposition or majority ( <b>OPP/MAJ</b> )	Flemish agency for internal affair, database local mandates	Positive for opposition
4	<b>Multiple office holding</b>	Weekers et al. (2007) Askim (2008)	Dummy for combination of political mandates (international, national, regional, province level or executive local mandate) vs not ( <b>CUMUL</b> )	Belgian Bulletin of Acts, Orders and Decrees	Positive for cumul
5	<b>Businesslike background</b>	Anessi-Pessina, Nasi & Steccolini (2008) (Brusca 1997) Askim (2008)	Dummy for professional use of financial information vs not ( <b>PROF.USE</b> )	Survey council party leaders (N= 363)	Positive for prof. use
<b>CONTROL VARIABLE</b>	(size)	Anessi-Pessina, Nasi & Steccolini (2008)	Population (natural logarithm of population in municipality 2011) ( <b>LN_population</b> )	Belgian Federal Public Service Economy 2011	

Figure 5: Results of the regression analysis

ANOVA: Dependent Variable: mean SCORE_NPM_acquaintanceship						
Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	419,435	6	69,906	4,689	0,000
	Residual	5306,896	356	14,907		
	Total	5726,331	362			
Regression		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	11,456	3,612		3,172	0,002
	EXPERIENCE	0,05	0,025	0,102	1,982	<b>0,048</b>
	OPP/MAJ	1,29	0,417	0,161	3,093	<b>0,002</b>
	PROF.USE	0,931	0,434	0,115	2,145	<b>0,033</b>
	CUMUL	1,319	0,704	0,098	1,874	<b>0,062</b>
	EDU_ECONOMY	0,355	0,503	0,038	0,706	0,481
	LN_population	0,132	0,369	0,018	0,357	0,721
	R	R Square				
	,271a	0,073				

In the analyses of the results it is fruitful to remember that the first hypothesis related to party leaders' experience. Our results reveal a positive influence of experience on party leaders' NPM acquaintanceship. The longer party leaders are council members, the better they are acquainted with NPM concepts.

The second hypothesis on the impact of opposition versus majority turns out contradictory to what we expected. Party leaders belonging to the majority have a better knowledge of applied NPM concepts in Flemish municipal councils than opposition leaders. Maybe they are closer to the College of mayor and aldermen and consequently have a certain knowledge advantage? They could also be more involved with the operational activities and service delivery in the municipality.

The third hypothesis about professional use of financial information is confirmed in our results. Party leaders using financial information for professional reasons are better positioned to be more acquainted with businesslike concepts and tools.

The fourth hypothesis about the positive impact of multiple office holding also corroborates with our expectations, although the results are only supported at the 10% significance level. The combination of different political mandates promotes familiarity with businesslike concepts and tools used in Flemish municipalities.

Finally, the fifth variable about economic education and the control variable are both statistically not significant. There is neither an effect of economic education of party leaders nor of the size of the municipality on their NPM acquaintanceship.

However, in interpreting the results we should be cautious for correlations (see figure 6 in appendix) between the dependent variables. This certainly requires further statistical testing. Preliminary tests reveal that professional use of financial information is most relevant for politicians without economic education and that multiple office holding is most relevant for opposition members in explaining their NPM acquaintanceship.

### **Conclusions (to be completed)**

NPM reforms of local government have attempted to sensitize local politicians for the NPM doctrine. Concerning party leaders we could conclude that they are in general well acquainted with applied NPM concepts in Flemish municipalities, although there are significant differences between the five measured concepts.

Three of the five hypotheses are accepted as expected with only the hypothesis on formal political role showing the opposite sign. Number of years in council, being a party leader of the majority, professional use of financial information and the combination of different political mandates positively influence party leaders acquaintanceship with NPM concepts in Flemish municipalities.

Issues for further research could certainly include the adding of other predictors to increase the explained variability in the model or extending the research to all councillors.

## Appendix

Figure 5: Descriptives for all variables in the regression model:

	Descriptive Statistics				
		N 363	Minimum	Maximum	Mean
DV	mean_SCORE_NPM_acquaintanceship		0,4	5	2,93
H 1	EXPERIENCE		0,1	41	12,00
			Frequency	Percent	
H 2	OPP/MAJ	opposition	202	55,60%	
		majority	161	44,40%	
H 3	PROF.USE	no	147	40,50%	
		yes	216	59,50%	
H 4	CUMUL	no	328	90,40%	
		yes	35	9,60%	
H 5	EDU_ECONOMY	no	280	77,10%	
		yes	83	22,90%	
Control	LN_population		7,67	11,67	9,73

Figure 6: Correlations

non-parametric correlations								
			EXPERIENCE	OPP/MAJ	PROF.USE	CUMUL	EDU_ECONOMY	LN_population
Spearman's rho	EXPERIENCE		1					
	OPP/MAJ		-0,044	1				
	PROF.USE		0,074	0,014	1			
	CUMUL		0,1	,197**	0,041	1		
	EDU_ECONOMY		0,01	-0,024	,275**	-0,022	1	
	LN_population		-0,029	-0,032	0,091	-0,031	0,01	1
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).								

Figure 7: Paired sample T test between 5 components of NPM\_acquaintanceship\_score

Paired Samples Test									
		Paired Differences					t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)
		Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference				
					Lower	Upper			
Pair 1	familiarity_mgt_team - familiarity_IC	0,581	1,028	0,054	0,475	0,687	10,776	362	<b>0,00</b>
Pair 2	familiarity_mgt_team - familiarity_mgt_control	0,656	1,185	0,062	0,533	0,778	10,545	362	<b>0,00</b>
Pair 3	familiarity_mgt_team - familiarity_budgetownership	0,369	1,178	0,062	0,248	0,491	5,969	362	<b>0,00</b>
Pair 4	familiarity_mgt_team - familiarity_autonomization	0,102	1,368	0,072	-0,039	0,243	1,42	362	0,157
Pair 5	familiarity_IC - familiarity_mgt_control	0,074	1,207	0,063	-0,05	0,199	1,175	362	0,241
Pair 6	familiarity_IC - familiarity_budgetownership	-0,212	1,159	0,061	-0,332	0,092	-3,486	362	<b>0,001</b>
Pair 7	familiarity_IC - familiarity_autonomization	-0,479	1,413	0,074	-0,625	0,334	-6,464	362	<b>0,00</b>
Pair 8	familiarity_mgt_control - familiarity_budgetownership	-0,287	1,149	0,06	-0,405	0,168	-4,749	362	<b>0,00</b>
Pair 9	familiarity_mgt_control - familiarity_autonomization	-0,554	1,331	0,07	-0,691	0,416	-7,924	362	<b>0,00</b>

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